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Does lawsuit data collection deter police misconduct lawsuits? 
One might think so, judging from recent scholarship on police 
accountability and deterrence.1  The best of this work argues that 
police learn from lawsuit data collection, without actually proving 
the point.2  While I agree with the premise that law enforcement 
agencies may learn from better and more complete information, 
there is little proof that lawsuit data collection deters police 
misconduct lawsuits.3  As a result, additional research is necessary 
in order to support or to deny this claim. 
I modeled and tested this claim in a recent paper: Do Police 
Learn from Lawsuit Data?4  My paper introduced a new § 1983 
dataset5 in order to determine if lawsuit data collection correlates 
with better deterrence of published misconduct cases.  This dataset 
drew on 10,044 cases that were brought against twenty-six U.S. law 
enforcement agencies.6  I matched these published cases with police 
 
  J.D. 2012, University of Chicago Law School; M.U.P. 2006, New York 
University; M.Sc. 2003, London School of Economics; B.A. 2000, University of 
Michigan.  Special thanks to Amos Jones, Taimoor Aziz, and Lionel Foster. 
 1. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The 
Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 853 (2001). 
 2. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The 
Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 
1086 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics]; Joanna C. Schwartz, 
What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 890 (2012) 
[hereinafter Schwarts, What Police Learn]. 
 3. See generally VICTOR E. KAPPELER, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICE CIVIL 
LIABILITY (3d ed. 2001). 
 4. Randall K. Johnson, Do Police Learn from Lawsuit Data?, 40 RUTGERS 
L. REC. 30, 36 (2012). 
 5. “The primary vehicle for asserting federal claims against local public 
entities and public employees is the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983.  
[The statute’s] broad language . . . led to its present status as the primary 
source of redress for a wide variety of governmental abuses.”  Robert W. Funk 
et al., Civil Rights Liability, in ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL LAW: CONTRACTS, LITIGATION 
AND HOME RULE (2012 ed.) 
 6. Johnson, supra note 4, at 35.  I used LexisNexis Advance to perform the 
research, and I searched using the following legal search terms: Villa /s Rica /s 
Police; Farmington /s Police; New /s York /s Police; District /s Columbia /s 
Police; Boise /s Police; Philadelphia /s Police; San /s Jose /s Police; New /s 
Orleans /s Police; Buffalo /s Police; Chicago /s Police; Cincinnati /s Police; 
Nashville /s Police; Albuquerque /s Police; Prince /s Georges /s County /s Police; 
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employment data7 in order to compute officer-to-lawsuit ratios.8  
These computations were done for all twenty-six law enforcement 
agencies and three separate groups of departments.9  After 
comparing these average ratios, at the individual and group levels, I 
found that departments that consistently gather lawsuit data do not 
perform better than other law enforcement agencies.10  This finding 
indicates that police may not learn from lawsuit data collection.11  
As a result, law enforcement agencies may need to identify a more 
promising approach.  One approach, which is often overlooked by 
departments, is third-party data collection. 
This Essay argues that third-party data collection, particularly 
of administrative complaints and departmental audit information, 
holds greater promise than lawsuit data collection.  It does so by 
asserting that third-party data collection is more useful for three 
reasons.  First, third-party data collection may prevent 
manipulation by individual police officers and law enforcement 
agencies.  Second, it may assure that police behavioral trends are 
identified. Lastly, third-party data collection may help to deter 
published § 1983 cases.  This Essay, however, only models and tests 
the final claim. 
I.  METHODOLOGY 
This Essay models and tests one claim: that police may learn 
from third-party data collection.  In doing so, it draws on the same § 
1983 dataset that I used to find out if police learn from lawsuit data 
collection.  As in my earlier work, better deterrence is equated with 
higher officer-to-lawsuit ratios.  Less effective deterrence, in 
contrast, is equated with lower average ratios.  By comparing these 
average ratios, at the individual and group levels,12 I found a 
 
Portland /s Police; Detroit /s Police; Seattle /s Police; Denver /s Police; Los /s 
Angeles /s Police; Oakland /s Police; Pittsburgh /s Police; Sacramento /s Police; 
Steubenville /s Police; Wallkill /s Police; Los /s Angeles /s County /s Sheriff and 
New /s Jersey /s State /s Trooper.  These results were restricted by jurisdiction 
(U.S. Federal), citation (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and timeline (six intervals were 
used: 01/01/2006 to 01/01/07; 01/01/07 to 01/01/08; 01/01/08 to 01/01/09; 01/01/09 
to 01/01/10; 01/01/10 to 01/01/11; 01/01/011 to 01/01/2012). 
 7. See Brian A. Reaves, Census of State & Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies, 2004, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL. (June 2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov 
/content/pub/pdf/csllea04.pdf. 
 8. Johnson, supra note 4, at 34 & n.25 (“Ratios describe the relationship 
between two quantities, as expressed by one number being divided by the 
other.”). 
 9. Id. at 38–42 (noting that the groups are law enforcement agencies that 
consistently gather lawsuit data, law enforcement agencies that ignore lawsuit 
data, and a control group, which inconsistently gathers lawsuit data). 
 10. Id. at 37. 
 11. Id. 
 12. The three groups are law enforcement agencies with access to 
complaint data and audit data, law enforcement agencies without access to 
2013] WHY POLICE LEARN FROM THIRD-PARTY DATA 3 
baseline for each subset and another for the entire population.  The 
baselines helped me to determine two things: whether the 
departments are a part of the same population and are distributed 
along a normal distribution. 
This approach compliments regression analysis in several ways.  
First, officer-to-lawsuit ratios provide a simple way to test new 
hypotheses.  Second, this approach shows whether lawsuits have 
been deterred.  Third, officer-to-lawsuit ratios account for 
differences in department size.  Finally, this approach captures the 
effect of changes in litigation strategy such as no-settlement 
policies.13 
The preceding analysis indicates that officer-to-lawsuit ratios 
may be useful, even with a relatively small population.14  This 
approach, however, will not be valid when law enforcement agencies 
do not meet a minimum “size” threshold.15  The minimum size, at 
least in this paper, is 330 officers.  These departments also must 
face more than a nominal amount of published § 1983 cases.  The 
failure to meet each requirement means that a department will be 
excluded from this Essay’s analysis.16  These two issues, and other 
potential problems, are dealt with deliberately, with an eye toward 
avoiding methodological issues.17 
Within this context, I evaluate a single claim: that law 
enforcement agencies with greater access to third-party data are, on 
average, more effective in deterring published § 1983 cases.  This 
claim is evaluated by determining whether law enforcement 
agencies with greater access to third-party data have higher officer-
to-lawsuit ratios than other departments (with less access to third-
 
third-party data, and a control group, which has access to one type of third-
party data. 
 13. See, e.g., Heather Kerrigan, Chicago’s Police Misconduct Cases Go to 
Court, GOVERNING (Feb. 2011), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice 
-safety/Chicagos-Police-Misconduct-Cases-Go-to-Court.html. 
 14. Johnson, supra note 4, at 33 (“In addition to [the] restrictions 
[described above], only published cases are used so as to exclude frivolous 
claims, settlements and textbook applications of § 1983.  Each of these 
precautions are necessary, in order to [test Schwartz’s hypothesis.]”).  Nothing, 
however, would preclude departments from providing information about the full 
“universe” of § 1983 cases.  By doing so, law enforcement agencies would 
increase the target population size, individual sample sizes, and the reliability 
of this indirect measure of police misconduct. 
 15. See Baruch Lev & Shyam Sunder, Methodological Issues in the Use of 
Financial Ratios, 1 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 187, 187–88 (1979). 
 16. Examples are Farmington, Steubenville, Wallkill, and Villa Rica. Data 
for each department are accompanied by an asterisk (*), which indicates that 
data for that department are not used to compute group-level averages. 
 17. Johnson, supra note 4, at 35 (“Selection effects are addressed by testing 
only [certain departments] . . . , which have similar histories of police 
misconduct. Omitted variables are accounted for by creating a control group[, 
which is roughly the same size as the other two groups].  Reverse causation is 
addressed by treating the time period [as either an independent variable or] as 
a dependent variable.”). 
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party data).  This finding will substantiate or deny the claim that 
police may learn from third-party data collection. 
II.  RESULTS 
As I stated earlier in this Essay, my § 1983 dataset has 10,044 
cases.  These cases were published by LexisNexis between 2006 and 
2012.  I restricted these data by year (2006 to 2012), jurisdiction 
(federal district court), and cause of action (§ 1983).  Next, these 
cases were matched with police employment data in order to 
compute officer-to-lawsuit ratios for twenty-six law enforcement 
agencies.  I also used this dataset to compute average ratios for 
three groups of departments (law enforcement agencies with access 
to complaint data and audit data, departments without access to 
third-party data, and a control group, which has access to complaint 
data or audit data).  These officer-to-lawsuit ratios are given, 
individually and by department group, in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
As illustrated in Table 2, law enforcement agencies with access 
to complaint and audit data had an average ratio of sixty-two to 
one.18  Departments without access to third-party data,19 which are 
described in Table 3, had an officer-to-lawsuit ratio of forty-three to 
one.  
The control group,20 which is highlighted in Table 4, had an 
average ratio of fifty-one to one.  When these ratios are compared, it 
is clear that departments with more access to third-party data 
perform better than others.  This finding supports the claim that 
police learn from third-party data collection. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay demonstrates that law enforcement agencies with 
greater access to third-party data are, on average, more effective in 
deterring published § 1983 cases.  As a result, police may learn from 
more third-party data collection.  These law enforcement agencies, 
however, should avoid situations that distort third-party data.  For 
example, third-party data may be less accurate when regulators and 
police officers share office space.21  It also may have limited 
usefulness when data collection is not done in a timely manner or 
 
 18. These law enforcement agencies are New York, Boise, Philadelphia, 
San Jose, New Orleans, Chicago, Albuquerque, and Denver. 
 19. These law enforcement agencies are Villa Rica, Buffalo, Cincinnati, 
Prince George’s County, Detroit, New Jersey, Los Angeles PD, Steubenville, and 
Wallkill. 
 20. These law enforcement agencies are Los Angeles County, Farmington, 
Washington, D.C., Nashville, Portland, Seattle, Oakland, Pittsburgh, and 
Sacramento. 
 21. See, e.g., Rob Wildeboer, Police Oversight Agency Moving from Chicago’s 
South Side, WBEZ91.5 (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.wbez.org/story/police 
-oversight-agency-moving-chicagos-south-side-92881. 
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employs substandard procedures.22  Lastly, third-party data may be 
less effective when there are costly barriers to reporting police 
misconduct.23 
Fortunately, each of these data-collection issues may be 
overcome by employing solutions that are grounded in practice. 
Several examples may be found in legal clinics, especially when law 
students are used to collect and analyze third-party data.24  Other 
examples arise in regulatory settings and draw on public resources, 
staffing, and expertise.25  Lastly, additional examples may emerge 
over time, especially if new legislation calls for more robust third-
party data collection.26 
In summary, it is clear why police learn from third-party data 
collection.  First, it may provide better and more complete 
information about the underlying causes of misconduct.  Second, 
third-party data collection may be useful for modeling actual police 
behavior.  Lastly, third-party data collection may help departments 
overcome heuristic biases and other informational failures. 
  
 
 22. See, e.g., Al Baker & Joseph Goldstein, Police Tactic: Keeping Crime 
Reports Off the Books, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A1. 
 23. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 47.5 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.6 (2008). 
 24. See, e.g., Craig B. Futterman et al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to 
Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago Police 
Department’s Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. OF SOC. JUST. 251, 252 (2008). 
 25. See, e.g., CITY OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, CLAIMS 
REPORT FISCAL YEARS 2009 & 2010, at 1-2, 34–35 (2011). 
 26. See, e.g., N.Y. City Council, Int. No. 130 (2010). 
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TABLE 1.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR TWENTY-SIX LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 







Officers to  
§ 1983 cases 
*Villa Rica *No *No *206 to 1 
L.A. County No Yes 129 to 1 
*Farmington *No *Yes *125 to 1 
New York Yes Yes 99 to 1 
Washington, D.C. Yes No 93 to 1 
Boise Yes Yes 66 to 1 
Philadelphia Yes Yes 65 to 1 
San Jose Yes Yes 64 to 1 
New Orleans Yes Yes 63 to 1 
Buffalo No No 58 to 1 
Chicago Yes Yes 56 to 1 
Cincinnati No No 52 to 1 
Nashville No Yes 51 to 1 
Albuquerque Yes Yes 48 to 1 
Prince George 
County 
No No 41 to 1 
Portland No Yes 40 to 1 
Detroit No No 39 to 1 
New Jersey No No 37 to 1 
Seattle No Yes 35 to 1 
Denver Yes Yes 34 to 1 
Los Angeles No No 30 to 1 
Oakland Yes No 22 to 1 
Pittsburgh Yes No 19 to 1 
Sacramento No Yes 18 to 1 
*Steubenville *No *No *17 to 1 
*Wallkill *No *No *17 to 1 
* Indicates that data for that department are not used to 




 27. Johnson, supra note 4, at 43–45. 
 28. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics, supra note 2, at 1090. 
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TABLE 2. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WITH ACCESS TO COMPLAINT 
DATA AND DEPARTMENTAL AUDIT DATA 




































New York 36118 309 303 320 358 452 436 363 99 to 1 
Boise 330 5 3 4 4 9 3 5 66 to 1 
Philadelphia 6832 93 106 95 110 95 133 105 65 to 1 
San Jose 1342 13 18 19 27 24 24 21 64 to 1 
 
New Orleans 
1646 20 25 31 27 20 32 26 63 to 1 
Chicago 13129 164 165 210 215 297 358 235 56 to 1 
Albuquerque 951 22 11 19 31 22 17 20 48 to 1 
Denver 1405 32 25 38 40 58 55 41 34 to 1 




 29. Reaves, supra note 7, at app. 2, 4. 
 30. Johnson, supra note 4, at 38–42. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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TABLE 3. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WITHOUT ACCESS TO 
COMPLAINT DATA OR DEPARTMENTAL AUDIT DATA 
 




































*Villa Rica *35 *1 *0 *0 *0 *0 *0 *0 *206 to 1 
Buffalo 750 4 10 18 5 18 23 13 58 to 1 
Cincinnati 1048 25 20 21 18 15 19 20 52 to 1 
Prince George 
County 
1344 17 24 23 38 45 53 33 41 to 1 
Detroit 3512 68 73 77 101 125 102 91 39 to 1 
New Jersey  2768 62 63 92 63 74 94 75 37 to 1 
Los Angeles 9099 145 229 297 390 386 403 308 30 to 1 
*Steubenville *50 *2 *5 *3 *2 *2 *3 *3 *17 to 1 
*Wallkill *33 *3 *0 *4 *1 *1 *3 *2 *17 to 1 




 36. See Reaves, supra note 7, at 9–10; Johnson, supra note 4, at 41–42. 
 37. Johnson, supra note 4, at 41–42. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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TABLE 4. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WITH ACCESS TO COMPLAINT 
DATA OR DEPARTMENTAL AUDIT DATA 
 




































LA County 8239 49 30 53 77 92 83 64 129 to 1 
*Farmington *125 *1 *0 *1 *1 *1 *3 *1 *125 to 1 
Washington, 
D.C. 
3800 39 38 38 37 43 52 41 93 to 1 
Nashville 1212 18 15 23 16 30 41 24 51 to 1 
Portland 1050 21 31 19 31 23 31 26 40 to 1 
Seattle 1248 39 39 31 43 35 29 36 35 to 1 
Oakland 803 29 30 41 37 47 35 37 22 to 1 
Pittsburgh 892 26 33 42 54 62 67 47 19 to 1 
Sacramento 677 28 42 26 34 49 42 37 18 to 1 





 43. Reaves, supra note 7, at app. 2, 4. 
 44. Johnson, supra note 4, at 38–42. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
